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Abstract (169 words) 
We examine the effects of majority buyout investments on employment numbers in unlisted firms or businesses taken 
private in Japan between 1998 and 2015. In our sample (n=184), regular employment grows at an uncorrected average 
of 12.3% during a mean holding period of 4.3 years, and an annual growth differential of +1.7pp relative to a matched-
pairs sample. 
Evidence from field interviews indicates that the positive growth differential primarily results from funds not cutting 
jobs beyond a certain threshold for reputational concerns. These concerns moderate the decisions of funds at two 
stages in the investment process: funds tend to avoid investing in businesses with major restructuring needs, and to 
prefer growth-centred to cost-cutting strategies. The effect on employment differs neither between foreign and 
domestic investors, nor between domestic funds owned by management and domestic funds owned by large financial 
or corporate groups, when controlling for other influencing factors (e.g., size, deal type, length of holding period, 
year-fixed effects). This implies that the reputational concerns outweigh differences in ownership and origin. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been considerable research on the effects of buyout investments on employment numbers, with 
most studies finding either significantly negative effects or no significant effects at all. Earlier research 
has predominantly focused on the most mature buyout markets, the USA and the UK. Our study 
complements the body of research with insights into the employment outcomes of buyout investments in 
Japan.  
Buyout investing through private equity funds (hereafter PEBO) started with a corresponding 
regulatory change in 1998.1 In the very same year, both established foreign and new domestic players 
became active in the Japanese market (Kubo 2014). By 2010 cumulative PEBO investments amounted to 
an estimated USD 57 billion, six times the figure for Australia, and formed by far the largest market in the 
Asia-Pacific (Fleming 2018). The advent of this new type of investor caused considerable concern. For 
instance, in one of the earliest articles on the Japanese buyout market, Fuchita (1999) anticipated that 
buyouts would take firm root as an alternative corporate restructuring tool – potentially with the same 
negative consequences for employment as observed in more mature buyout markets like the US, or the 
UK. While anecdotal evidence suggests that buyout funds in Japan have rarely engaged in large-scale 
cutbacks in the workforce (Yeh 2012), no systematic study exists to date.  
Our study presents the first comprehensive evidence of the effect of PEBO on employment for 
Japan. Using a dataset of fund-led majority buyout transactions concluded in private and publicly listed, 
subsequently privatized businesses between 1998 and September 2015, we document substantial increases 
in standard employment during the holding period. We find employment grows at an uncorrected average 
of 12.3% during a mean holding period of 4.31 years. Comparing compound annual growth rates (CAGR) 
to a matched sample, we find a difference of +1.73% p.a. in employment growth relative to the matched 
sample. Event studies comparing growth rates before and after the buyout transactions (differences in 
differences) show a significant growth differential, indicating that fund managers are not merely buying 
trends, but are bringing about the observed increases in employment through their managerial choices.  
Our data also enables testing for differences in employment effects, first, between domestic funds 
and their foreign (mainly Anglo-Saxon) competitors operating in Japan, and second, between domestic 
funds owned by management (hereafter independent funds) and domestic funds owned by large financial 
 
1  In 1998, “The Law Concerning Investment Trust and Investment Corporation” entered into force and allowed the 
establishment and operation of corporation-type investment vehicles, such as hedge funds, REITs, venture capital 
and buyout funds. See also Hamao and Matos (2018).  
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or corporate groups (hereafter dependent funds). Contrary to our hypotheses, we do not find significant 
differences between the three types of investors: neither between foreign fund managers (mainly from 
Anglo-Saxon countries) and their domestic competitors, nor between independent and dependent domestic 
funds. Based on a series of interviews, we conclude that the relative scarcity of investment targets and the 
ensuing intensified competition for deals motivates all three types of investors to minimize reputational 
risks linked to the Japanese institutional environment, namely to the norm of employment protection. As 
we find, these reputational concerns moderate managerial decisions of all three types of investors. 
Our efforts directly complement recent studies by Nose and Ito (2012) and Hamao and Matos 
(2018). Nose and Ito (2012) also study, among other aspects, employment effects of buyout investments, 
but in public companies (private investment in public equity; PIPE) with systematically low price-to-book 
ratios. They find that employment decreases by 29.3pp in the second year after investment. Thus, in 
contrast to our study, they document a significant reduction in employment for this particular segment of 
buyout investments. 
Hamao and Matos’ study (2018; in this journal) on activist investors in Japan inquires yet another 
segment of alternative investments. As in our study, Hamao and Matos do not find a substantial difference 
between foreign and domestic investors (2018: Table 4, Panel A on p.43). At the same time our study 
differs in two important aspects. Firstly, as Nose and Ito (2012), Hamao and Matos exclusively inquire 
minority investments into publicly listed companies. Secondly, in contrast to their analysis of stock market 
returns and operational performance measures, we use the number of regular employees during the holding 
period (i.e., when a buyout fund is in control of the target firm) to measure the impact of fund ownership.2 
Our choice of impact measure was motivated by the interest in the employment effects of buyout investing, 
and proved apt to counter the paucity of publicly available data on unlisted companies. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews existing relevant research. Section 3 
develops a set of hypotheses for the Japanese context. Section 4 describes the population, sample, and 
methodology. Section 5 presents quantitative results. Section 6 discusses quantitative findings and 
provides contextualization through qualitative evidence from a series of interviews. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Because the vast majority of regular employees in Japan work full-time, their number approximates full-time 
equivalents (FTE). 
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2. Related studies 
The effects of PEBO on employment growth have been predominantly analysed through the lens of agency 
theory. Buyout investments are regarded as vehicles that increase efficiency by reducing agency problems, 
such as the pursuit of size over profit, empire building, and operational inefficiencies, potentially leading 
to a reduction in employment. By acquiring a controlling equity stake, buyout funds temporarily become 
the dominant shareholder with an incentive to act (Berle and Means 1932; Williamson 1964). As new and 
temporary investors, they may be less reluctant to break implicit contracts with stakeholders than long-
term shareholders or incumbent management (Shleifer and Summers 1988; Schaefer 1998). 
The entrepreneurial view, on the other hand, argues that for a successful exit, investee companies 
must display a history of strong growth. Buyout funds can facilitate growth in a number of ways, 
eventually leading to increased employment (Wright, Hoskisson, and Busenitz 2001). Managers can be 
freed from restrictions on growth opportunities such as divisions of large integrated bureaucratically run 
firms in a weak competitive position, state-owned enterprises, or privately-owned firms with succession 
problems. Access to finance can be provided or financial constraints reduced (Engel and Stiebale 2014). 
A strong entrepreneurial spirit can be instilled among management (Houlden 1990; Beaver 2001), or 
entrepreneurial management practices developed (Bruining, Verwaal, and Wright 2013). 
 
Comprehensive overviews and reviews of existing studies of the effects of PEBO on employment 
can be found in Bacon, Wright and Demina (2004), Wright, Gilligan, and Amess (2009), Lutz and 
Achleitner (2009), Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero (2011), Tåg (2012), and Guery, Stevenot, Wood, and 
Brewster (2017).3  Only two studies support the entrepreneurial view with significant positive effects of 
PEBO on employment. Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011) report an 18% absolute increase in French 
PEBO businesses over an average of four years, and the global study by Bernstein, Lerner, Sorensen, and 
Strömberg (2016) finds a 0.6% positive annual growth differential. The majority of studies with significant 
results, however, document negative effects, thus supporting the ‘efficiency buyout’ relevance of agency 
theory. Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2005) analyse a sample of 979 buyouts and 4,877 manufacturing plants 
in the UK during the years 1994–1998; by comparing the mean value of post-buyout to pre-buyout 
employment level, they find a 61% (weighted) job loss at manufacturing plants. Cressy, Munari, and 
 
3  We do not examine studies from buyout groups, industry associations, and labor organizations, due to the 
possibility of vested interests. 
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Malipiero (2011) study buyouts in the UK 1995–2000 and find that employment at investee companies 
falls by 7% as early as the first year post buyout, peaking at a 23% loss in the fourth year. Goergen, 
O'Sullivan, and Wood (2011) find a significant negative growth differential in the year immediately after 
the completion of the buyout. Davis et al. (2014) track employment by 3,200 firms in 150,000 
establishments in the USA that were subject to buyouts between 1980 and 2005. At the establishment 
level, employment shrinks by 3% relative to controls in the two-year period post buyout and by 6% over 
five years, resulting in a cumulative differential of 10 percentage points relative to controls. At firm level, 
target firms create new jobs in newly opened establishments at a faster pace than control firms, but 
correcting for the purchase and sale of establishments, the growth differential is less than -1% of initial 
employment over two years. Therefore, the authors conclude that buyouts lead to modest net job losses, 
but large increases in gross job creation (entrepreneurial strategies) and job abolition (efficiency strategies).  
A substantial number of studies do not find any significant net effect on employment. These 
include Kaplan (1989), Amess and Wright (2007), Bergström, Grubb, and Johnsson (2007), Amess and 
Wright (2012), and Amess, Girma, and Wright (2014). This may be due to the offsetting of efficiency and 
entrepreneurial approaches as documented in the study of Davis et al. (2014), or due to approaches that 
have no substantial bearing on employment.4 
Literature has identified a number of factors potentially moderating the impact of PEBO on 
employment. For instance, the host country’s institutional environment shapes the business activities of 
multinational firms in general, and of PEBO in particular (Bruining, Boselie, Wright, and Bacon 2005; 
Engelen, Konings, and Fernandez 2008; Lutz and Achleitner 2009; Bacon, Wright, Meuleman, and 
Scholes 2012; Bedu and Montalban 2013; Mingo, Junkunc, and Morales 2018). Boucly, Sraer, and 
Thesmar (2011) attribute the strong cumulative employment increase in French PEBO between 1999 and 
2004 (+18% between the four years preceding the transaction and the four years following it) to the 
alleviation of credit constraints. They conclude that in countries with less mature capital markets, the role 
of PEBO may be to complement the public capital market and provide companies with access to otherwise 
unavailable external growth finance. 
 
4  Such as financial arbitrage, which does not affect the underlying business, but creates value purely from 
differences in firm valuation between acquisition and divestment. 
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There has been considerably less work on the country-of-origin effect in buyout investing. This 
view, rooted in the literature of comparative capitalism, explains differences in behaviour between foreign 
and local firms by the differing institutional regimes of the home country: in liberal market economies 
(such as the US and UK), shareholders or firm owners enjoy extensive rights; in coordinated market 
economies (such as Germany, France, or Japan), employees enjoy greater rights, and employment is more 
secure (Jackson 2003; 2005). In line with this argument, a recent study by Guery, Stevenot, Wood, and 
Brewster (2017) finds foreign buyout investors in France significantly more likely to cut jobs than French 
investors. 
Adding to the former two effects, there is evidence that within-country heterogeneity in 
institutional contexts may moderate buyout investing. Pe’er and Gottschalg (2011) find for the USA that 
the strategic choices of PEBO funds differ according to whether the state government is Republican or 
Democrat. Using election results as proxies for the institutional context they show how this affects the 
decision making of funds. In concrete terms, norms guiding the behaviour of firms towards employees, 
unions, the environment, and community issues are more firmly rooted in Democrat-led states, which 
implies higher transaction costs related to restructuring-oriented buyout strategies. 
Finally, the literature points to a number of further potential influencing factors. For instance, 
employment effects may vary by deal type. Amess and Wright (2007) observe that wage and employment 
growth differ between management buyouts and management buy-ins. Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011) 
find that in France employment growth mainly comes from private-to-private transactions. The same study 
equally points to differences between industries. In addition, the literature implies size that is negatively 
related to the size of target firms (Wright, Gilligan, and Amess 2009). 
3. Research questions and hypotheses 
We focus on the following two core aspects derived from previous research (see section 2). First, what is 
the net effect of PEBO on employment numbers? Second, does fund ownership moderate this effect? – In 
developing our hypotheses, it is helpful to briefly illustrate the Japanese context as documented in the 
literature. Japanese corporate culture has been likened to the ideal of a ‘company family’ (Bhappu 2000). 
Company unionism is found to continuously counter efforts at downsizing even after becoming slightly 
more accommodating after 1997 (Noda and Hirano 2013). Japanese labour law, as interpreted by the courts, 
is not only perceived as employee friendly, but also as effectively preventing layoffs other than in cases 
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of near-bankruptcy (Araki 2005). Anecdotal evidence (Yeh 2012) supports this view. This limits the cost-
cutting potential through the reduction of regular employment and increases the importance of (organic) 
growth strategies relative to other value-creating strategies.5 The Japanese contexts thus suggests:  
 
H1: The distribution of employment growth rates in PEBO is left truncated.6 
 
The literature further suggests that PEBO investors may be less reluctant to break implicit contracts with 
stakeholders than long-term shareholders or incumbent management (Shleifer and Summers 1988; 
Schaefer 1998), a view that can also be derived from Abe and Shimizutani’s (2007) finding that outside 
directors in Japanese firms are more inclined to implement layoffs and voluntary or early retirement, while 
inside directors are more likely to decrease new hiring and protect incumbent employees. Taken together 
this suggests: 
 
H2:  Entry of a PEBO investor causes a decline in employment growth. 
 
Turning to the question of how fund ownership moderates the employment effects of PEBO, we can 
chiefly distinguish between three categories of investors: between foreign and domestic, and – within the 
latter – between independent and dependent funds.7 Pertaining to the former distinction, we expect foreign 
funds (mainly headquartered in Anglo-Saxon countries)  to be harsher on employment than local funds, as 
evidenced for PEBO in France by Guery, Stevenot, Wood, and Brewster (2017) as well as for listed 
Japanese businesses with foreign shareholders (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; Noda 2012), or subjected 
to cross-border M&A (Fukuda 2020). Because foreign funds have weaker ties within business and society 
we may thus expect that they can abrogate implicit contracts such as the lifetime employment promise 
more easily. Secondly, as we learn from Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005, the negative effect of foreign 
investors on employment was significant only in businesses that are weakly embedded into domestic 
institutional networks (e.g., main banks and large investors). Against that background, the very fact of 
receiving PEBO funding implies that investee companies already are weakly embedded or are at least 
 
5  Note that we exclude non-organic strategies such as selling off business units or M&A. 
6 Left truncation implies the existence of a lower negative boundary larger than the theoretical minimum of –1 
(cases in which operations are entirely discontinued within one year). 
7 By “foreign” we mean offices or subsidiaries of foreign private equity firms that are active in the Japanese buyout 
market. By “independent” we refer to domestic funds owned by management, whereas by “dependent” we refer 
to domestic funds owned by large financial or corporate groups.  
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willing to cut ties with local institutional stakeholder. This, in turn, implies that they are more susceptible 
to the effects of foreign ownership. Taken together these two considerations suggest: 
 
H3:  Employment growth is smaller under foreign than under domestic fund ownership.  
 
Pertaining to the difference between independent and dependent domestic funds, we argue that (1) choices 
of individuals are dependent upon their social context (Okuno-Fujiwara 2002); and that (2) these two types 
of funds constitute such differing social contexts. Dependent funds belong to large firms that are deeply 
embedded in the Japanese stakeholder system. In these firms, long-term employment of regular employees 
is generally more prevalent, particularly so in very large companies. Reportedly, these companies strive 
to protect their regular employees even in times of recession such as after the global financial crisis of 
2008 (Ono 2010; Takahashi 2018).  
Thus, the social context of fund managers may influence their behaviour as investors and may moderate 
their choice of value-capturing strategies. Accordingly, we argue that managers in funds associated with 
large financial groups are more likely than independent fund managers to espouse values honouring 
regular employment and may be more determined to avoid lay-offs in portfolio firms. Taken together, this 
suggests: 
 
H4:  Employment growth is smaller under independent than under dependent fund ownership.  
4. Data and methodology 
Our dataset, assembled and cross-evaluated using government reports, fund websites, press searches, and 
data provided by a Japanese fund-of-funds, approximates the raw population of majority buyout 
transactions conducted by funds registered in Japan between 1998 and September 2015 as Nraw = 794. 
Deducting 234 deals with no exit confirmed by September 2015 (i.e., effects on employment still ongoing), 
111 minority transactions (implying limited control over employment), 31 property-centred deals, late-
stage VC transactions (7), and cases of investments outside Japan (7) gives us an effective population of 
Neff = 404. Employment figures for 224 investee companies were obtained from Teikoku Databank, and 
funds were also asked to provide employment figures on their investee companies. In order to avoid 
‘cherry picking’, we made full data disclosure a prerequisite for participation. Eventually, seven funds 
provided data on 77 exited portfolio companies. With data on 45 companies received from both sources, 
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size of the raw sample was Nraw = 256.  
In adjusting the timing of employment data to entry and exit dates, we reached a mean deviation 
of less than one month (-10.9 days for entries, and -25.9 days for exits). Because the effective date for the 
bulk of employment adjustments in Japan is 1 April, we excluded 17 cases (6.64% of raw sample) with 
employment data given for a point in time later than the following 31 March after entry of the PEBO 
investor.8 This reduced the raw sample to 239 cases (204 firms covered by Teikoku Databank, 66 by fund 
manager data, and 31 by both sources). Employment levels at entry and exit were approximated by linear 
interpolation and extrapolation respectively. TABLE A (appended) documents the properties of these 
operations. 
In the next step we used 62 valid pairs of firm/year observations received from both sources to 
test for a potential reporting bias by fund managers. As neither one- nor two-sided tests could confirm a 
statistically significant difference, the data obtained from fund managers was integrated.9  Notably, the 
difference in the mean correction factors of employment at entry and exit contributes 1.68 percentage 
points to a conservative estimate of employment growth under fund ownership. Finally, the following 
were also excluded: 35 cases with insufficient employment data on either entry or exit; seven cases with 
less than ten regular employees at time of investment10; and 13 cases with holding periods of up to one 
year.11 The effective sample therefore contains Neff = 184 cases (or 45.5% of the population).  
 
A number of particular methodological challenges for empirical inquiries into employment effects have 
been identified in the literature. Wright, Gilligan, and Amess (2009) point out that using gross headcount 
instead of full-time equivalents does not account for changes in employment practices, such as an 
increasing share of part-time work. Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero (2011) and Davis et al. (2014) highlight 
the risk of measurement errors, such as wrongly counting the effects of the purchase or sale of a business 
unit as organic growth. To this is added the risk of bias caused by selective or restricted samples. Taken 
 
8  Dropping these observations was a judgment call between (a) a potential bias from mis-classifying employment 
adjustments PEBO investors as “done by previous owners”, and (b) a loss of precision through reduced sample 
size. Because we could not tax the potential risk of bias and given that excluding these 17 cases with poor timing 
of employment data and entry of PE investors only reduced the raw sample by 6.64%, we opted for (b). 
9 This test, however, does not preclude the possibility of self-selection among participating funds (see discussion 
of robustness in Section 6). 
10  For the smallest businesses with about 10 regular employees the minimum adjustment of 1 headcount translates 
into as much as a 10% change. While this implies that growth rates in smaller businesses are subject to more 
variation, it does not create any systematic up- or downward bias. 
11 Deals with holding periods < 1 year known as ‘flip-deals’. Buyout funds merely act as business brokers aiming to 
identify a strategic buyer for the acquired business, but do not systematically engage in value-creating efforts. 
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together, we have:  
1.  Measurement errors: 
(a) Use of gross headcount instead of full-time equivalents. 
(b) Unwarranted inclusion of cases with acquisitions or divestments of business units during the 
holding period.  
2. Sampling issues:  
(a) Excluding buyouts that involve the sale or acquisition of business units (in an attempt to avoid 
measurement error 1(a) above). 
(b) Missing checks for representativeness owing to unknown populations.  
 
Because full-time equivalents are not available, we address 1(a) by relying on the regular full-time 
employee headcount. Given the fact that between 1998 and 2015, the number of non-standard employees 
in Japan increased from 11.76 to 19.79 million (headcount; CAGR 3.35%), while standard employment 
was decreasing from 37.94 to 32.77 million (headcount excluding executives; CAGR  
–0.86%), the regular employee headcount can be considered a strongly conservative measure of total 
employment. For 1(b) we check all transactions in the sample for acquisitions and divestments of business 
units during the holding period and identify 17 cases (or 6.64%< of the raw sample). While dropping these 
cases may imply a risk in terms of 2(a), we were able to safely do so because our dataset enables a 
comparison of the sample and its subsets with the population. Here we found the sample well-balanced 
with regard to an important number of dimensions such as its distribution over time (App. Table B), the 
size of investee companies and duration of holding period (App. Table C), and the sample composition by 
deal type, fund category, and industries (App. Tables D and E). Accordingly, we believe that our case is 
not subject to any major issue of type 2(b). 
5. Results 
We start with the absolute effect of PEBO on employment numbers. We first compare standard (regular) 
employment levels at entry and exit of fund investors and find a positive bottom-line effect with a mean 
increase of 12.26% during an average holding period of 4.31 years. In the sample subset consisting of data 
obtained from Teikoku Databank (n = 137) this figure reduces to a still impressive 10.44% (cf. Table 1, 
section I; overleaf).  
This mean increase, however, says nothing about the distribution of growth rates in the firms 
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subjected to PEBO transactions.  Our H1 suggests that it might be left truncated, because compliance with 
the institutional framework should imply a lower boundary to employment adjustments. In order to be 
able to test for this distributional characteristic, we standardize growth rates in our sample by using CAGR. 
As can be seen in Figure A (below), we find hardly any values below –20%, a reduction in employment 
that can be attained using a combination of natural fluctuation (around 10% for small and medium 
businesses), and voluntary retirement schemes.  
FIGURE 1: COMPOUND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF STANDARD EMPLOYMENT DURING  
HOLDING PERIOD BY ENTRY YEAR 
 
 
Recent literature finds the distribution of growth rates in economic variables most closely follows a 
Cauchy distribution (Williams, Pinto, Brijesh, and Park 2015). Using a maximum likelihood estimator12 
we fit our data to a Cauchy distribution.13 As the Cauchy distribution is symmetric, its location parameter 
should coincide with the sample mean in the absence of truncation. If left truncated, this means that the 
sample mean is larger than the location parameter. In order to determine whether the estimated location 
parameter of 1.041% (SE 0.455) may reasonably coincide with the sample mean (1.775), we determine a 
90% one-sided interval for the location parameter from standard errors, which yields a critical value (1.623) 
below the sample mean. We further verify this finding by using a bootstrap function14, which yields a 
 
12  R package 'fitdistrplus'; see: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/fitdistrplus/fitdistrplus.pdf 
13 None of Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramér-von Mises, and Anderson-Darling statistics suggest rejection. 
14  'boot.ci' function of R's package 'boot'; see: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/boot/boot.pdf 
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more conservative threshold (1.710), still below the sample mean. We also use the estimated Cauchy 
distribution to calculate the probability of obtaining all 184 realizations larger than the minimum value of 
–0.215 in our sample. This yields a probability of only 0.02% even when excluding the interval [–∞, –1] 
for theoretical reasons (businesses cannot have a negative number of staff). Taken together these tests 
confirm that the left part of our sample contains significantly fewer realizations than the estimated Cauchy 
distribution, i.e., confirming the hints drawn from Figure A. This evidences that funds are abstaining from 
large-scale dismissals of staff and corroborates H1. 
While the left-truncation of the Cauchy distribution evidences the existence of a lower boundary 
of employment growth, it remains unclear whether these growth rates are any different from growth rates 
in a sample of firms similar in terms of size, industry, and time span, that have not been subject to PEBO 
investments. We use a matched-pairs analysis to answer this question and find evidence of a significant 
positive contribution of PEBO investments to employment growth relative to the development in the 
matched-pairs sample. We create a matched sample from the approximately 5,000 businesses included in 
the Toyo Keizai Unlisted Company Edition (1998–2015) using entry and exit dates, industry 
classification, and number of employees at the time of investment (entry).15 Ideally, we would have been 
able to use performance measures for this matching in order to account for earlier trends. For example, if 
PE investors had invested into businesses with above-average performance, this would have given them a 
head-start in terms of employment growth. However, this would have meant to substantially reduce our 
effective sample to n = 132, for which useful performance data is available. To tax a potential bias from 
this, we cross-checked the performance distribution (after-tax return on sales16) for these 132 cases against 
the performance expected for a random sample of businesses with the same sizes, industries, and entry 
years as in our sample. Doing so we found a mean difference of only +0.14pp (details on this are in App. 
Table I). Accordingly, we believe that the risk of a systematic bias is very limited.  
 
15   The matching of entry and exit timing cancels out year effects. Relying on unlisted businesses helps to account 
for systematic differences in corporate governance in general (Fukuda et al. 2018), and for employment practices 
in particular (Konzelmann et al. 2006). Industries are subject to differences in life- and business cycles and are 
thus taken account of in a great many of studies (e.g., Guery et al. 2017). Size (number of employees) is relevant 
because we find that growth declines with size (as documented in our Table 3). We achieved a 100% match for 
the first three categories and were able to keep average deviation of employment numbers in the matched sample 
at only 7% above our original sample (SD = 0.49). Details on industry classifications for matching process are 
documented in the Notes to appended Table E. 
The estimated impact of size is around +1.5% p.a. per every tenfold increase in regular headcount for the three 
models used. Accordingly, the estimated loss of precision from our matching is negligible at about 0.07pp (from 
SD), and even more so for the mean bias at about 0.035pp (from mean difference). 
16  Operating margins would have provided a clearer picture, but the only performance data available for our cases 
(from Teikoku Databank) are after-tax profits, and sales.  
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TABLE 1: STANDARD EMPLOYMENT GROWTH UNDER FUND OWNERSHIP (%) 
 Original sample Sample 50+ 
   Confidence (90%)  (n=159) 
 mean p-value lower   upper one-sided mean p-value 
(I) Total growth during holding period    
Full sample (n=184) 12.26 0.00 6.78 17.75 7.99 11.55 0.00 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ (n=137) 10.44 0.01 4.24 16.64 5.61   
Subset ‘Fund’ (n=47) 17.57 0.00 5.93 29.20 8.50   
(II) Compound annual growth rates 
     
Full sample (n=184) 1.63 0.01 0.56 2.70 0.79 1.62 0.02 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ (n=137) 1.12 0.12 –0.06 2.29 0.20   
Subset ‘Fund’ (n=47) 3.11 0.04 0.74 5.49 1.26   
(III) Differences in compound annual growth rates relative to matched sample 
Full sample (n=184) 1.70 0.02 0.30 3.10 0.53 1.63 0.03 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ (n=137) 1.62 0.04 0.07 3.16 0.32   
Subset ‘Fund’ (n=47) 1.94 0.23 –1.21 5.09 -0.70   
(IV) Compound annual growth rates corrected for industry effects and labour market trends 
Full sample (n=184) 1.77 0.01 0.48 3.07 0.69 1.78 0.01 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ (n=137) 1.47 0.05 0.02 2.92 0.26   
Subset ‘Fund’ (n=47) 2.65 0.07 –0.16 5.47 0.29   
Notes:  Subset ‘Teikoku’ includes cases exclusively involving data from Teikoku Databank; subset ‘Fund’ 
includes all cases involving data obtained from funds. Bold font indicates significance of 90% or better. 
For (IV) sample industries Nr. 1 through 13 as in App. Table E attributing to the following categories of 
the Labour Force Survey: 1 to “Medical, health care and welfare” (from 2003) and to “Services” (until 
2002); 2 to “Construction”; 3, 4, 6 and 8 to “Manufacturing”; 5 to “Finance & Insurance” (from 2003) and 
to “Financing &insurance, real estate” (until 2002); 7 to “Information & communications” (from 2003) 
and to “Transport & communication” (until 2002); 9 to “Information & communications” (from 2003) and 
to “Transport & communication” (until 2002); 11 to “Wholesale & retail trade” (from 2003) and to 
“Wholesale & retail trade, eating & drinking places” (until 2002); 12 to “Services, N.E.C.” (from 2003) 
and to “Services” (until 2002); 13 to “Transport & postal activities” (from 2003) and to “Transport & 
communication” (until 2002). 
Comparing our sample to its matched pairs yields a +1.7pp annual growth differential (cf. Table 1, section 
III). To test the robustness of this analysis, we finally compute our test statistic using an industry-year 
adjustment as used by Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990), and Sousa and Jenkinson (2013) in the buyout 
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industry context.17 Results from this comparison of growth rates by industries and years are qualitatively 
similar, confirming our matched-pairs analysis. Results are summarized below in Table 1, section IV. 
While Table 1 provides substantial evidence of positive employment growth during PEBO ownership 
compared to a matched sample, it leaves causation largely unresolved, because buyout funds may simply 
make smart choices and buy into existing growth trends. To address this problem, we conduct event studies 
comparing growth rates before and after PEBO investment applying a differences-in-differences approach 
and calculate the change in growth differentials between our sample and its matched pairs. When 
comparing growth rates during the first year after investment to growth rates during the last year prior to 
investment, we do not find any significant difference (c.f. Table 2(I), subset A). However, shifting the 
focus to the second year under fund management produces a significant positive growth differential, a 
finding also robust to excluding data obtained from fund management (c.f. Table 2(I), subsets B and C). 
To check the robustness of our matched-pairs analysis, we use growth differentials between industry-year 
averages (as above) to compare with the differentials observed in our sample. Again, this yields 
qualitatively similar results (c.f. Table 2(II)). Evidence from these event studies, therefore, confirms that 
funds create a positive growth differential in investee companies. Results further indicate that growth 
strategies of PEBO investors become effective already from the second year after their initial investment. 
This implies rejection of H2, which suggests that the entry of a PEBO investor causes a decline in 
employment growth. 
 
17  We use the Labour Force Survey (Statistics Bureau of Japan 1998–2015) to adjust our data for the relevant 
industry-year-specific changes. We do so by expanding our employment figures by the inverse of the relative 
change in industry-specific employment figures during the holding period. The Labour Force Survey has monthly 
data from 2002, enabling almost perfect matching of entry and exit dates. As only annual data is available before 
2002, we use weighted averages for this earlier part of the sample.  
 Our data includes public-sector employment and are not corrected for size. Yet, these two potential biases are 
minor and conservative. Total annual employment growth between 2000 and 2015 including public sector is only 
marginally smaller than if excluded (CAGR 0.09%). Also, our sample contains larger businesses (median staff = 
200) than the Labour Force Survey. As documented in Table 3, every tenfold increase in size implies around 1.5% 
less employment growth. Accordingly, the net effect of the two biases is towards the conservative. 
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TABLE 2: DIFFERENCES IN DIFFERENCES FOR EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (PP) 
Reference periodyear n Mean Confidence (90%)   
(subset) (∈‘Funds’) (p-value) lower upper one-sided Min Max 
(I) Sample vs. matched pairs   
Entry1 – Entry-1  
(A) 
81 
(10) 
-0.85 
(0.77) 
–5.54 3.83 –4.50 –127.5 48.02 
Entry2 – Entry-1  
(B) 
65 
(7) 
7.91 
(0.01) 
2.86 12.95 3.97 –70.86 83.28 
Entry2 – Entry-1  
(C) 
58 
(0) 
5.70 
(0.06) 
0.64 10.76 1.76 –70.86 71.21 
(II) Sample vs. industry-year-adjusted values   
Entry1 – Entry-1  
(A) 
81 
(10) 
0.41 
(0.89) 
–4.54 5.36 –3.45 –143.53 62.91 
Entry2 – Entry-1  
(B) 
65 
(7) 
7.14 
(0.02) 
2.14 12.13 3.25 –70.91 67.20 
Entry2 – Entry-1  
(C) 
58 
(0) 
6.27 
(0.06) 
0.93 11.61 2.11 –70.91 67.20 
Notes:  Composition of subsets A and B results from data availability; subset C corresponds to subset B 
minus the cases involving data obtained from fund management. Bold font indicates significance 
of 90%, or better. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 pertain to the moderating effect of fund ownership on the employment impact. 
Ownership type includes domestic funds associated with large financial groups, domestic independent 
funds, and foreign (mainly Anglo-Saxon) funds. We have suggested that foreign funds generate less (H3), 
and domestic funds associated with large financial groups more employment growth (H4), both relative 
to independent domestic investors. We first estimate growth differentials of our matched-pairs analysis, 
controlling for other potential influencing factors, namely earlier growth, length of holding period, deal 
type, size, informational advantages of fund managers, and a flag for data obtained from funds (compare 
Table 3 for estimation output, and variable definitions). For robustness concerns we estimate two more 
variants of the dependent variable: employment growth by the industry-year approach; and an average of 
the former two. The evidence is clear: none of the variants produces a significant estimate for foreign-
owned funds, nor for the contrast between domestic dependent and domestic independent funds. 
Accordingly, we reject H3 and H4. 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATION OUTPUT FOR COMPOUND ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH  
Coefficients (%) Full sample (n = 184) 
 
Sample 50+ (n = 159) 
(SE) MPD IYA AVG MPD IYA AVG 
Fund ownership    
   
- Foreign     0.261 
(2.171) 
–0.834 
(2.084) 
–0.277 
(2.038) 
1.028 
(2.302) 
0.515 
(2.219) 
–0.770 
(2.173) 
- Independent 1.163 
(1.728) 
0.141 
(1.659) 
0.668 
(1.623) 
1.565 
(1.931) 
0.777 
(1.865) 
1.219 
(1.825) 
Controls    
   
Pre-entry growth  14.911 
(5.670) 
7.704 
(5.268) 
11.580 
(5.475) 
11.216 
(6.218) 
3.575 
(5.682) 
7.653 
(5.970) 
Holding period       
- 3 years     3.548 
(2.223) 
2.842 
(2.139) 
3.163 
(2.089) 
3.940 
(2.419) 
3.911 
(2.347) 
3.874 
(2.292) 
- 4 years     4.277 
(2.349) 
3.992 
(2.267) 
4.056 
(2.209) 
4.497 
(2.489) 
5.551 
(2.425) 
4.926 
(2.361) 
- 5 years     3.413 
(2.684) 
4.964 
(2.591) 
4.130 
(2.528) 
3.787 
(2.992) 
6.164 
(2.909) 
4.896 
(2.841) 
- 6 years     3.928 
(3.007) 
3.334 
(2.983) 
3.566 
(2.826) 
2.521 
(3.288) 
2.461 
(3.183) 
2.355 
(3.106) 
- 7+ years     0.737 
(2.634) 
1.710 
(2.520) 
1.146 
(2.467) 
0.534 
(2.909) 
2.554 
(2.801) 
1.465 
(2.743) 
Deal type       
- Private-to-
private 
2.900 
(2.232) 
2.234 
(2.146) 
2.545 
(2.098) 
3.445 
(2.559) 
2.313 
(2.467) 
2.864 
(2.416) 
- Public-to-
private (TP2) 
3.958 
(2.157) 
2.671 
(2.068) 
3.296 
(2.025) 
3.259 
(2.375) 
1.735 
(2.283) 
2.499 
(2.240) 
- Secondary 4.900 
(3.193) 
4.208 
(3.061) 
4.587 
(2.996) 
3.573 
(3.462) 
2.141 
(3.333) 
2.929 
(3.265) 
Log(size)  –1.321 
(0.591) 
–1.540 
(0.566) 
–1.435 
(0.554) 
-1.977 
(0.806) 
-2.385 
(0.780) 
-2.171 
(0.763) 
Financials 6.597 
(3.324) 
6.155 
(3.189) 
6.374 
(3.121) 
7.024 
(3.822) 
6.099 
(3.677) 
6.556 
(3.607) 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Flags    
   
Fund Data     2.658 
(1.813) 
2.770 
(1.726) 
2.704 
(1.696) 
2.328 
(1.851) 
2.885 
(1.774) 
2.599 
(1.744) 
 
Notes: Bold font indicates significance of 90% or better. F-statistics are significant at 95% or above for all set-ups but IYA (about 
90%) and variance inflation factors are all well below 3. Standard residual analytics (residuals vs. fitted, residuals vs. leverage, 
normal q-q, scale location, and heteroscedasticity) did not indicate any major concerns. Three cases of potential outliers were 
re-examined, but no measurement errors were found. 
Abbreviations: MPD = matched-pairs differences; IYA = industry-year approach; AVG = average of MPD and IYA.  
Variables: “Foreign” and “Independent” contrasts with the base category of funds associated with large financial groups.  
“Pre-entry growth” controls for prior growth and is employment growth during the 12 months prior to investment;  
“Holding period” contrasts deals with particular lengths (3, 4, 5, 6, 7+ years) to the base category of up to 2 years;  
“Deal type” contrasts private-to-private, public-to-private, and secondary deals to turnaround deals (base);  
“Size” corrects for decreasing growth opportunities and is log of number of regular employees at entry;  
“Financials” is an industry dummy and corrects for informational advantages of fund managers; 
“Year fixed effects” (entry) account for business cycle fluctuations; base category includes pre-2001 and post-2011 cases to 
keep variance inflation at a reasonable level (each <7 cases; compare App. Table A).“Fund data” marks data obtained from 
funds to account for potential self-selection in survey participation.  
Critically, data provided by fund management were evidently subject to a self-selection bias (compare the 
close-to-significant estimates of around 2.7pp for flag ‘Fund Data’ in Table 3). This implies a need to 
assess the representativeness of sample subsets used earlier for assessing the overall impact of PEBO 
investments (Table 1), and for our event studies (Table 2). We do so by approximating the baseline impact 
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on subset means as the sum-product of the structural differences between the sample and its subsets, and 
the estimated influence on employment growth. Our approximation of the implied biases challenges 
neither our finding of positive employment growth in businesses under fund ownership, nor that of funds 
as bringing about a positive growth differential (c.f. App. Table F). As a further robustness check we also 
run a model with a more granular version of the deal type control (turnaround vs. business successions, 
MBOs, divestments, and secondaries), which yields comparable results (see App. Table G). 
For very small businesses in our sample, even a headcount change of one employee translates 
into substantial relative change (e.g., changing headcount by one in a business of just ten regular 
employees). While as a general implication such heteroscedasticity only means that OLS loses efficiency, 
but remains unbiased, chances are that a few influential observations cause log of size to become a 
significant moderator (compare Table 3). For testing this possibility, we build a sample “50+” that 
excludes all business with less than 50 employees at entry of the PEBO investor. As it turns out, we obtain 
very similar results not only for our estimates of growth rates (Table 1), but also for our multivariate 
models (Table 3). Notably, in the latter, the control for log(size) remains significant, which implies that 
the convex shape of this relationship is not a random result from larger variation at the lower end of the 
distribution. 
6. Discussion 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we observe significant positive average 
employment growth in businesses under fund ownership and are able to evidence a left truncation of 
employment growth rates, i.e., the existence of a lower boundary to employment reductions (H1). Second, 
employment growth is significantly higher than in comparable firms, and event studies show that funds 
cause a positive growth differential from their second year of ownership (see Table 2). This implies 
rejection of H2. Third, the effect on employment in businesses under Anglo-Saxon fund ownership is no 
different from that of their domestic competitors, implying rejection of H3. Fourth, domestic independent 
funds do not create less employment than domestic dependent funds. Hence, we reject H4.  
The most important difference between our results for Japan and earlier research is the significant positive 
effects on employment growth. For Japan, this seemingly contrasts with Nose and Ito’s (2012) finding of 
substantial job cuts in Japanese PIPE investments. However, they focus on another segment of PE 
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investments, which defies any direct comparison.18  But even among the few studies on other economies 
that allow for such direct comparison, only the study Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar’s (2011) reports 
employment growth of a similar magnitude for buyout investments in France. In their sample, employment 
growth is explained by funds alleviating credit constraints for medium-sized unlisted companies. In 
contrast, this cannot possibly explain the positive PEBO effects for Japan, because apart from the period 
1997‒2003 access to finance in Japan has been intact (Koo 2009:46), a finding even extending into the 
years after the ‘Lehman shock’ (2009/10).  
Literature further points to size as a moderating factor, with larger businesses less likely to grow 
their number of staff (Wright, Gilligan, and Amess 2009). Given that the mean size of investee companies 
in our sample is substantially smaller (418 employees) compared to figures for most Western economies 
(e.g., 1,811 in the US study by Davis et al. (2014: 3963)), part of the employment growth observed for 
Japan may be a result of smaller average business size. Using the moderating effect of size as estimated 
in Table 3 of about –1.4pp per annum for every tenfold increase in size and expanding with the log of the 
size multiple (log(1811/418) = 0.64) we may tax this effect at around 0.90pp. Accordingly, the moderating 
effect of smaller business sizes adds up to an annual difference of less than 1pp. 
Differing growth rates by deal type might offer some additional explanation. As the dummy for 
the deal categories in Table 3 essentially tests whether employment growth is higher than for turnaround 
deals, applying one-sided tests is appropriate. Looking at the corresponding standard errors, we understand 
that 7 of the 9 estimates in Table 3 actually pass this test at 90% (all but private-to-private in models IYA 
and AVG). The difference maximizes between turnaround deals and secondary buyouts, with estimates 
ranging from 4.2 to 4.9pp of employment CAGR. This may relate to the previous fund ownership of 
secondary buyouts having already sought to improve efficiency (including in employment matters); hence, 
value creation needs to rely on growth strategies. While these findings are interesting in their own right, 
it seems that they equally do not suffice to explain the strong absolute growth observed for buyout targets, 
because secondary transactions are not unique to the Japanese market. 
 
18  In our view, the systematic selection of strongly undervalued businesses by PIPE investors arguably explains this 
finding. By our understanding, Nose and Ito’s 2012 employment figures are not differences from a matched-pairs 
analysis, but absolute values from their original sample. While this means that there is no direct evidence on such 
selection effect, our view builds on a comparison of the mildly negative pre-entry employment growth of -1.5% 
in our sample against the median price-to-book ratio of 28.6% in their sample (calculated from Nose and Ito 2012: 
Table 2). 
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Yet another route to explaining the magnitude of employment growth might be the realization of 
untapped potential through the seconding of professional management into investee companies. As 
Sugiura reports, this particularly applies to smaller businesses and to business succession deals (Sugiura 
2018). However, interacting size with "private-to-private" transactions to explore this possibility for the 
three models in Table 3 only showed that the interaction effect neutralizes the main effect of size.  
Finally, funds could alleviate impediments to growth from insufficiently professional 
management and poor access to human resources (Sugiura 2018), particularly for businesses in rural areas. 
Seconding management to such investee companies may resolve both issues. However, introducing a 
dummy for deals involving investments into businesses in rural areas19  did not produce technically 
significant estimates for either of the models in Table 3. Interestingly, all estimates came with negative 
signs (-1.7 to -2.8pp) suggesting that private equity funds cannot compensate for the general lack of 
opportunities in rural areas.  
Taken together, it seems that neither of these aspects can fully explain the magnitude of 
employment growth during the holding period.  
 
Using event studies, we were also able to evidence a causal effect of PEBO on employment from the 
second year after their entry. Contrary to our hypothesis H2, the growth differential caused by PEBO 
investors is positive. This is a rather surprising result in two respects. First, because it contradicts our 
hypothesis, by which we have expected outsider owners to be less reluctant to cut employment. Yet, taken 
together with our finding of a left-truncation (lower boundary), and the need of investors to create value 
added, growth can turn a necessity, and thus displace downsizing. We will revert to this in our discussion 
of insights obtained from interviews. Second, it seems surprising to find employment adjustments from 
the second year already in the light of the broadly held view that substantial increases of headcount in 
Japanese businesses require more time because they strongly depend on the hiring of new graduates (c.f. 
Kato 2001, Kester 1991). This view, however, strongly focuses on large and very large businesses where 
mid-career hiring is largely uncommon. However, with median of 200 regular employees, the firms in our 
sample are predominantly SMEs. Japanese SMEs, in turn, are known to rely on mid-career hiring quite 
substantially (Takeuchi and Wakabayashi 1998), and can thus more swiftly build up headcount, a trend 
 
19  Businesses headquartered outside the greater urban areas of Sapporo, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe, and 
Fukuoka-Kitakyushu. 
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that has reportedly increased since the early 2000s (Zhu and Hennings 2019). Eventually, in our interviews 
with funds (further details below), respondents confirmed that they regularly use mid-career hiring through 
specialized agencies.  
 
We now turn to our second question on whether the type ownership matters. We neither find significant 
differences between foreign and domestic funds (H3), nor between domestic dependent and domestic 
independent funds (H4). The former contrasts with Guery, Stevenot, Wood, and Brewster’s (2017), who 
find that Anglo-Saxon buyout investors are significantly more likely to cut jobs in France than domestic 
investors, particularly so in the aftermath of the financial crisis. They attribute this finding to efforts by 
French authorities aimed at encouraging French funds to mitigate job losses. They also muse that French 
funds might have had a greater notion of responsibility to their immediate social environment than outside 
entrants, and a more nuanced understanding of the long-term effects of present practices.20 Thus, while 
France and Japan might share a similar value system with regard to employment protection, it is only in 
France that foreign funds are more likely than their domestic counterparts to resort to employment 
reductions as a value-creating strategy.  
Similarly, we have to reject H4 about dependent investors being more employment-friendly. While, due 
to an absence of studies, our finding does not challenge any prior empirical research on PEBO investment 
in Japan, it still defies our initial intuition. To make up for this lack of reference studies, we add this 
finding to our agenda for a series of field interviews (see below).  
Among the controls used to isolate the effect of ownership (Table 3), the dummy-coded 
categorical variable for length of holding period produced significant positive parameter estimates with 
maximum values for deals exited within four, and also five years. This is a notable finding as it points to 
a non-linear relationship between the length of holding period and the effect of PEBO on employment. 
Tentatively, we may explain this inverse U-shaped relationship as the result of two combined effects. First, 
strategies aimed at boosting organic growth require time to play out in terms of employment, as 
documented in our event studies (see Table 2). In contrast, for longer holding periods, we may expect 
marginal effects of a change in ownership/strategy to decrease. Taken together this would imply smaller 
 
20  In contrast, Bacon, Wright, Meuleman, and Scholes (2012) suggest some adaptation of Anglo-Saxon buyout funds 
to local host country contexts. Adopting a pan-European perspective, they find that firms owned by Anglo-Saxon 
funds are as likely to introduce high-performance work practices as those owned by non-Anglo-Saxon buyout 
firms, suggesting some adaptation to the local host country contexts of buy-outs. 
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growth in deals with very short as well as with very long holding periods relative to deals with holding 
periods of medium length.  
 
To triangulate our findings, we conducted a total of 30 in-depth, semi-structured interviews in July 2015 
and January 2016 with management of investee companies (4), fund managers (17), company labour 
unions (5), and intermediaries and advisers (4).21 Interviews were subjected to pilot testing.22 With regards 
to the overall positive impact on employment, fund managers cited a number of reasons for the lower 
boundary on employment reductions (Figure 1). First, large-scale employment reductions are rarely 
necessary because the majority of deals concerns small to medium-sized companies that tend to have less 
slack than large companies. Domestic interviewees perceived foreign funds as taking a harsher stance on 
employment than Japanese funds but noted that their focus is on larger deals. Both explanations are 
consistent with our finding that size is negatively related to employment growth (see Table 3).  
 Second, funds tend to consciously avoid deals requiring major employment reductions for 
concerns about reputation. This directly materializes as improved (or at least ‘intact’) chances of winning 
future deals. Respondents across all three ownership categories pointed to the dominance of the selling 
side in the Japanese buyout market (“too much capital chasing too few targets”) as the major reason for 
their moderation in employment reduction. Firms seeking for or willing to accept PEBO investors may 
actually choose between a number of competing funds, and selling to a buyout fund that will eventually 
make drastic cuts in the workforce negatively reflects back on former owners as well. Moreover, fund 
managers report that listed companies reduce overstaffing by internal transfers before carving out a 
business in order to prevent negative media attention, a practice that may continue into the holding period 
if the selling side remains minority shareholder.23 Reportedly, selling parties may even add employee 
protection clauses to contractual obligations (see also The Economist 2010). Thus, in many cases 
inefficiencies related to employment have already been resolved prior to divestment or have been made 
contractually ‘untouchable’. Interviewees further reported that owners of private businesses with visibility 
 
21  Most fund managers had previously provided employment data, and some of the access gained to labor unions, 
investee companies, and intermediaries was through fund managers and advisers. In each category, however, we 
secured sufficient evidence from interviews arranged on our own initiative to rule out the possibility of selection 
effects. 
22 During the pilot interviews both researchers actively engaged in the discussion. As a result of the pilot testing, 
however, the setting was changed to one researcher asking questions and leading the interview, while the second 
researcher focused on taking extensive handwritten notes, because the interviewees were uncomfortable with the 
interview being recorded due to the perceived sensitivity of the topic. Interview duration was approximately one 
hour. 
23  Sugiura (2019:155) reports that these cases are “typical” for divestment transactions in Japan. 
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on the local level would rather let their firm go bankrupt or not find a successor than “throwing one’s 
employees to the vultures”. In contrast to views commonly found in the literature, legal constraints were 
not considered a major reason for avoiding job cuts, an assessment shared by labour unions.  
Taken together, reputation matters for all funds active in the Japanese market regardless of 
ownership category. Arguing that the selling side was essentially dominating the Japanese buyout market, 
fund respondents univocally noted that securing their reputation was the major motivation for mitigating 
major job cuts. This also explains the concessions on employment and staffing issues reported as equally 
applying to foreign funds (CNN 2002), and ultimately explains why H3 and H4 do not hold. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Our research questions were: 1. What is the impact of PEBO on regular employment levels in Japan?  
2. Does fund ownership matter?  
 In a sample of firms with a median of 200 employees, we find that regular employment grows 
at an uncorrected average of 12.3% during a mean holding period of 4.31 years, and an annual growth 
differential of +1.7pp relative to a matched-pairs sample.  Event studies show significantly higher growth 
rates during the holding period than under the previous ownership, which implies a causal relationship. 
While employment decreases in some deals, the lower limit is around –20%, evidencing that standard 
employment is not reduced beyond a certain threshold. 
Our quantitative analysis further finds employment growth negatively related to the size of target 
firms, confirming findings from earlier research. We also find compound employment growth with a non-
linear relationship to the holding period, where short (less than three years) and very long deals (six and 
more years) are outperformed by deals closer to the average of four to five years. Tentatively, we may 
explain the former by the time required until growth strategies take effect, and the latter by decreasing 
marginal effects of a change in ownership and strategy.  
Contrary to our hypotheses, we find no significant differences in the effect on employment numbers 
neither between Anglo-Saxon and domestic funds, nor between dependent and independent domestic 
funds. Our series of interviews indicate that reputational concerns relating to the institution of employment 
security are at the heart of our findings. These concerns moderate the decisions of funds at two stages in 
the investment process: funds tend to avoid investment in businesses with major restructuring needs, and 
to prefer growth-centred over cost-cutting strategies. Interviewees report that lay-offs are minimized 
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because their negative consequences affect the reputation of sellers and acquirers alike. Regardless of their 
ownership structure, funds risk access to future deals if excessively laying off employees, because the 
Japanese buyout market is essentially a seller’s market with funds competing for deals (not businesses 
competing for capital). Thus, reputational concerns outweigh differences in ownership and origin. 
Combined with the small mean size of investee companies (with relatively more growth opportunities), 
this may explain the significant positive growth differential observed during the holding period. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A: PROPERTIES OF DATA PROCESSING IN SAMPLE 
  Mean SD 
SD 
(months) Min Max 
Time adjustment  Entry –10.9 132 4.39 –358 323 
(temployment data – ttransaction; 
in days) 
Exit –25.9 116 3.87 –354 237 
       
Inter-/extrapolation Entry   0.83 7.54  –33.4 47.3 
(given – adjusted staff 
numbers; in %) 
Exit –0.85 5.56  –61.8 15.3 
NOTES: Timing adjustment documents our matching of the timing of entry and exit to that of our employment data. 
   Inter-/extrapolation notes the resulting deviation of employment numbers relative to the closest data point. 
INTERPRETATION: Mean time deviation is negligible at <30 days. Inter-/extrapolation results imply that our growth 
estimate for the entire holding period of 12.26% may include a conservative margin of some 1.68pp (0.83 – (0.85)). 
TABLE B: POPULATION COVERAGE OF SAMPLE BY VINTAGE YEAR  
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Sample & Matched Sample 
(n=184) 
0.50 0.40 0.48 0.34 0.40 0.40 0.57 0.45 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ (n=137)  0.13 0.27 0.19 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.38 0.32 
Subset ‘C’ (n=58)  0.13 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.13 
 
Sample coverage (cont’d) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Sample & Matched Sample 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.58 0.85 0.13 0.50 0.46 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.54 0.85 0.13 0.40 0.34 
Subset ‘C’ 0.16 0.28 0.04 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.14 
 
Notes: 
Matching score was 100% for entry (vintage) year. 
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TABLE C: DISTRIBUTION OF TRANSACTION VALUE AND HOLDING PERIOD  
 N Mean(log) SD(log) Median Min Max 
Transaction value (bn yen)       
Population 356 1.59 0.68 3.86 0.10 415 
Sample 166 1.62 0.66 4.53 0.12 352 
   Subset ‘Teikoku’ 119 1.66 0.68 4.58 0.12 352 
   Subset ‘C’ 52 1.65 0.70 4.45 0.12 352 
       
Holding period (months)       
Population (HP > 12 months) 383 1.64 0.230 43.4 13.0 224.0 
Sample 184 1.66 0.228 45.4 13.0 144.0 
   Subset ‘Teikoku’ 137 1.68 0.231 47.7 13.0 144.0 
   Subset ‘C’ 58 1.78 0.169 59.9 25 144.0 
 
Notes: Median calculated as 10^mean(log). 
TABLE D: COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE AND POPULATION BY  
TYPE OF FUND AND TYPE OF TRANSACTION AND EXIT 
 
Dimension 
 
Category 
Population  
(N=404) 
Sample  
(n=184) 
Subset 
‘Teikoku’ 
(n=137) 
Subset ‘C’  
(n=58) 
Fund type Dependent (J) 0.51 0.55 0.47 0.41 
 Independent (J) 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.34 
 Foreign 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.24 
      
Deal type Divestment 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.33 
 Turnaround 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.17 
 MBO 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.24 
 PIPE TP* 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.14 
 Business succession 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.05 
 Secondary buyout 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 
 NA 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 
*Private investments into public equity (PIPE) refer to buyout firms acquiring stock of a listed company. If the 
acquired company is subsequently delisted, the transaction is referred to as ‘take private’ (TP). 
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TABLE E: COMPOSITION OF POPULATION, SAMPLE AND AND MATCHED SAMPLE BY INDUSTRY (%) 
 
Industry 
Population  
(N=404) 
Sample  
(n=184) 
Matched 
Sample 
(n=184) 
Sample Subset 
‘Teikoku’ 
(n=137) 
Sample 
Subset ‘C’ 
(n=58) 
1 Bio/health care/medical   5.20   6.52   6.52 5.84 8.62 
2 Construction   2.97   3.26   3.26 4.38 0.00 
3 Consumer goods & other  
   products 
10.15 10.33 10.33 8.76 13.8 
4 Electronics/machinery/  
   automobile 
15.10 20.11 20.11 24.1 22.4 
5 Finance/insurance   5.69   4.89   4.89 5.11 3.45 
6 Food/agriculture   7.67 10.87 10.87 9.49 8.62 
7 IT/telecoms/internet   7.18   5.98   5.98 5.84 3.45 
8 Materials/chemicals/         
   metals/mining 
  6.19   5.43   5.43 5.84 5.17 
9 Media/publishing/  
   contents 
   5.45   4.35   4.35 3.65 1.72 
10 Restaurants   3.71   4.35   4.35 3.65 1.72 
11 Retail/wholesale 10.64   7.61   7.61 7.30 8.62 
12 Service 16.09 14.67 14.67 13.1 17.2 
13 Transportation/  
     distribution 
  3.96   1.63   1.63 1.46 1.72 
Notes:   
Matching score for industries was 100%. Industry categories assigned by authors and matched to Toyo Keizai’s 
Unlisted Company Edition (1998-2015) as follows: 1 to Pharmaceuticals; 2 to Construction; 3 to Building materials, 
furniture, textiles, clothing, other manufacturing industries ; 4 to Other transportation devices, machinery, metal 
products, automobiles, precision machinery, precision devices, electrical devices, and transportation devices; 5 to 
Leasing, banking, commodity futures, securities, trust banks, credit sales and credit cards, life insurance, property 
and casualty insurance, other finance, money lending and credit cards, investment business, investment trusts, 
investment advisory, insurance; 6 to Foodstuffs, agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 7 to Systems and software 
development, information, systems and software, information services and other information; 8 to Glass, soil, 
rubber, leather, rubber products, pulp, paper, chemicals, mining, oil, coal, petroleum, coal, steel, electricity, gas, 
electric power and gas, nonferrous metals; 9 to Printing, video and music, advertising, publishing, newspapers, 
communications and broadcasting; 10 to Eating and Drinking places; 11 to Glass and soil wholesale, supermarkets, 
convenience stores, other wholesale, pharmaceuticals wholesale, chemical wholesale, machinery wholesale, car 
sales, retailing, food product wholesale, precision instruments wholesale, petroleum and fuel wholesale, specialty 
stores, textiles and clothing wholesale, paper wholesale, general wholesale, other retailing, steel and metals 
wholesale, electrical equipment wholesale, electric apparatus wholesale, department stores, transportation 
equipment wholesale; 12 to Outsourcing, consulting, hotels, leisure, entertainment, machinery and equipment 
maintenance, machinery and other repairs, education, architectural design, building management, building security, 
temporary staffing and contracting, other services, real estate, travel; 13 to Cargo transportation, shipping, aviation, 
warehousing and wharves, warehousing and logistics-related, rail and bus, land transportation. 
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TABLE F: POPULATION AND SAMPLE SUBSET COMPOSITION  
AND ESTIMATED BASELINE IMPACT 
   
Population† 
(%) 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ (n=137) 
Subset ‘C’  
(n=58) 
Dimension Category 
Structure 
(%) 
Impact 
(pp)  
Structure 
(%) 
Impact  
(pp) 
Holding period 
(years) 
2 17.49 13.14 –0.26   1.72 –0.95 
3 21.93 22.63  0.05 17.24 –0.32 
4 18.02 17.52 –0.04 25.86  0.64 
 5 13.58 14.60  0.10 17.24  0.34 
 6   7.57   7.30 –0.02 12.07  0.34 
 7p 15.67 18.98  0.19 25.86  0.57 
Industry Finance/ 
insurance 
5.69 5.11 –0.04   3.45 –0.17 
Vintage 2004 13.12 11.68 –0.10 10.34 –0.19 
 2011   3.22   8.03  0.42   5.17  0.17 
Deal size 
(mean(log(value)))†† 
  1.59   1.62 –0.05   1.65 –0.10 
Sum of estimated impact   0.23   0.34 
 
Notes:   
Subset ‘Teikoku’ as used in Table F, subset ‘C’ as used in Table G.  
Impact estimated as product of structural differentials and parameter estimates of Table H. 
†   n = 383 for holding period >12 months, n = 404 for industry and vintage, n = 355 for deal size 
†† nTeikoku = 119, nC = 52     
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TABLE G: ESTIMATION OUTPUT FOR COMPOUND ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (PP) 
Coefficients Full sample (n = 184) 
 
(SE) MPD IYA AVG 
Fund ownership    
- Foreign        0.104 
(2.182) 
–0.959 
(2.100) 
–0.421 
(2.052) 
 - Independent 1.460 
(1.747) 
 
0.266 
(1.682) 
 
0.876
(1.643) 
 
Controls 
Pre-entry growth  13.480 
(5.771) 
7.212 
(5.356) 
)) 
10.545 
(5.578) 
Holding period   
- 3 years             3.544 
(2.228) 
2.806 
(2.151) 
3.147 
(2.098) 
- 4years             4.770 
(2.376) 
4.213 
(2.304) 
4.422 
(2.242) 
- 5 years             3.591 
(2.684) 
5.039 
(2.599) 
4.267 
(2.534) 
- 6 years             4.161 
(3.020) 
3.391 
(2.916) 
3.718 
(2.844) 
- 7+ years            0.785 
(2.637) 
1.732 
(2.531) 
1.188 
(2.475) 
Deal type    
- Bus. succession       0.277 
(2.558) 
0.971 
(2.463) 
0.614 
(2.406) 
- MBO            3.147 
(2.319) 
1.965 
(2.241) 
2.530 
(2.187) 
- Divestment           3.911 
(2.225) 
2.716 
(2.130) 
3.305 
(2.091) 
- Secondary 4.276 
(3.169) 
3.798 
(3.044) 
4.068 
(2.978) 
Log(size)  –1.365 
(0.546) 
–1.541 
(0.567) 
–1.456 
(0.554) 
Financials 7.044 
(3.361) 
6.381 
(3.232) 
6.712 
(3.161) 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Flags    
Fund Data          2.671 
(1.836) 
2.720 
(1.751) 
2.683 
(1.719) 
Notes:  
F-statistics, variance inflation factors, and residual analytics with qualitatively equal outcomes as in Table 3. Bold 
font indicates significance of 90% or better.   
Abbreviations and definitions as in Table 3; deal types contrast to base category “turnaround”. 
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TABLE H: SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE AND MATCHED SAMPLE (FREQUENCIES) 
 
Number of regular Employees 
Sample  
(n=184) 
Matched Sample  
(n=184) 
11-29 0.071 0.071 
30-99 0.212 0.207 
100-299  0.326 0.332 
300-999 0.299 0.299 
1000+ 0.092 0.092 
 
Notes:  
Mean difference (Matched Sample – Sample) is 0.070, SD of that difference is 0.497.  
 
TABLE I: PERFORMANCE DISTRIBUTION IN SUB-SAMPLE AND CORRESPONDING RANDOM MATCH 
Sample dimensions 
Sub-sample 
Return on sales 
(%; A) 
Random match 
Expected RoS 
(%; B) 
Difference 
(pp; A–B) n 
Firm size I (staff)     
- SME (up to 300) 1.66 1.29 0.37 79 
- Large (more than 300) 2.14 2.32 -0.18 53 
Firm size II (Paid-in capital; JPY) 
    
- Less than 500 million 1.15 1.12 0.03 17 
- 500 million to less than 10 billion 0.99 2.12 -1.13 37 
- More than 10 billion 3.86 3.75 0.11 7 
Entry period     
- 1999 through 2004 1.62 1.33 0.29 53 
- 2005 through 2007 1.65 2.35 -0.70 44 
- 2008 through 2013 2.47 1.47 1.00 35 
Grand total 
 
1.85 
 
1.71 
 
0.14 
 
132 
 
Notes:  
We define performance as after-tax return on sales. Data is available from Teikoku Databank for entry years of 144 
businesses in our sample. We exclude 12 cases outside the interval [ –.50; +.50] to account for outliers (e.g., 
extraordinary gains and losses such as write-offs or earlier unrealized gains), which reduces effective n for this com-
parison to 132. 
For the expected RoS of a random match we take reference values from METI’s Chûshôkigyô no kei’ei shihyô for 
1999 through 2002 and from the subsequent Chûshô kigyô jittai kihon chôsa for 2003 through 2013. For the 53 
businesses with more than 300 employees we use their paid-in capital to reference values from METI’s Kigyô katsudô 
kihon chôsa (1999-2013). We also use the latter for referencing businesses with less than 300 employees for 3 cases 
of negative performance and 6 cases of industry categories not included in the 1999-2003 kei’ei shihyô, the latter 
including one case of the former. Firm size II only includes the cases referenced by paid-in capital. 
The 6 cases subjected to Chûshôkigyô no kei’ei shihyô reference our industries 4, 6, 8 (as of App. Table E) as 
“Manufacturing”, and 11 as “Retail”. For the 65 cases referenced by Chûshô kigyô jittai kihon chôsa we attribute 
our 1 to “Manufacturing” (4 cases), and “Services (3 cases); 2 to “Construction”; 3, 4, 6, 8 to “Manufacturing”; 7 
and 9 to “Information & Telecoms”; 10 to “Restaurants & Lodging”; 11 to “Retail”, and “Wholesale”, respectively; 
12 to “Services”; and 13 to “Transportation”. Finally, in the Kigyô katsudô kihon chôsa we reference 1, 5, 7, 9, 12, 
13 to “Services”; 2 through 4, 6 and 8 to “Manufacturing”; 10 to “General eating services”, and 11 to “Retail”. 
